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ABSTRACT
Laboratory experiments are used to generate data that facilitate investigation of pricing
behavior in forward and spot markets, Results suggest a tendency for prices in a spot
market to converge to levels higher than those in a forward market. The difference in
these marketenvironmentsis the supply schedule. Buyers in a spot marketare aware that
supply is inelastic and become relatively aggressive bidders. Forward markets have a
relatively elastic supply schedule and buyers fare better.This may motivate firms to pro-
mote forward marketsand/or vertically integratein the procurementof inputs.
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Trends are occurring in agricultural industries
which are dramatically altering the basic struc-
ture of exchange. In particular, there are move-
ments toward tighter vertical coordination in
commodity and food distribution channels
(Barkema, Drabenstott, and Welch; Boehlje).
The purpose of this study is to explore,
through observation of human behavior in the
laboratory, one particular trend-an increased
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use of forward contracting in intermediate
product markets.
Study Objective
The objective of this study focuses on pricing
behavior in forward (production-to-demand)
and spot (advance production) markets. Trade
prices in these two market institutions are ex-
plored in isolation (i.e., only one method of
exchange or the other exists), in order to ob-
serve any similarities and differences in elic-
ited behavioral tendencies, and to further the
understanding of their relationship to and in-
teraction with one another in the natural
world. Attention is focused toward addressing
the issue of the relative price level in spot and
forward market institutions in a laboratory set-
ting. A study of this behavior may be partic-
ularly useful, given that prices in naturally oc-
curring forward markets are not observable,
because they typically result from private ne-
gotiations.328 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics,
Production precedes sales in a spot market,
and there is a risk of failing to recoup costs
that is not present in a forward market insti-
tution. We therefore collect data from labora-
tory markets in order to test the following hy-
pothesis: Ho: pf = p.,versus H,: p,f# I.L,, where
s refers to the spot market andfto the forward
market, and p,,is mean price in the ith market
type.
Selected Previous Research
Mestelman and WeHand, and Smith (1962)
conducted laboratory studies particularly rel-
evant to the current research which focused on
aspects of advance production in double auc-
tion markets. A summary of Mestelman and
Welland’s results suggests that the production
condition (advance or to-demand) does not
have a statistically significant effect on mean
contract prices. Market efficiency, however,
was found to be slightly lower in the advance
production market relative to the production-
to-demand market. The researchers reasoned
that this was due to the slightly lower levels
of production and sales observed in the ad-
vance production markets. The results of
Smith’s experiment indicate lower prices in
spot markets relative to forward markets. He
attributes this finding to a “distress sale” char-
acteristic of the spot market.
Other related laboratory studies have ex-
amined issues of price behavior in thin mar-
kets (Nelson and Turner) and asymmetric in-
formation (Adam et al.). In the former study,
results of a laboratory thin market revealed no
systematic price bias from a thin English auc-
tion market with eight traders, as compared to
that from a thick private negotiation market
with 22 traders. Price variation was found to
be lower in the thin auction market. Adam et
al. designed an experiment to analyze the ef-
fects of both market structure and quality of
information held by participants on transac-
tions prices in a single-sided English auction.
Experiment results suggest that prices in such
auctions can be depressed by buyers, particu-
larly if those buyers possess market power.
Methods and Procedure
This study proposes the use of
December 1997
laboratory ex-
perimental methods (as described by Hoffman
and Spitzer; Plott; and Smith 1982) as an ap-
proach to test the difference in spot and for-
ward market prices. The primary interest is to
observe the effect of risk of seller loss from
advance production, which exists in a spot
market, on market behavior and outcomes.
Such risk is not present in a forward market.
This suggests two treatments: a forward mar-
ket treatment (henceforth identified as treat-
ment F) and a spot market treatment (hence-
forth denoted as treatment S ).
Six trading sessions were conducted, three
under each treatment. Eight student subjects
were recruited from agricultural economics
and business courses for each session. Each of
the six trading sessions began with an instruc-
tional phase, consisting of the following two
steps. First, a written set of instructions was
given to each participant and read aloud by
the monitor. Participants were led through hy-
pothetical trading examples from both a buy-
er’s and a seller’s perspective. Second, partic-
ipants were led through a practice trading
period on the computer. During this time, par-
ticipants were instructed in the mechanics of
submitting and accepting bids and asks; and
for sellers under treatment S, choosing pro-
duction levels.
With the exception of an instructional
phase of the experiment, each session was
conducted entirely over a network of personal
computers. Subjects, in the exclusive role of
either buyer or seller, interacted anonymously
over this network producing and trading a
commodity referred to generically as “units,”
following standard experiment procedure. In
keeping with Smith’s (1976) induced value
theory, participants were compensated for
their efforts through cash payments tied di-
rectly to the level of accumulated earnings
gained through trade. The average cash reward
over all sessions was $28.41, with a minimum
of $21.55 and a maximum of $34.30. The av-
erage total earnings for each spot treatment
were $25.75, $29.72, and $28.51. Average
payoffs for the forward sessions were $28.46,Krogmeier et al.: Price Discovery in Forward and Spot Markets 329
$29.12, and $28.93. The time commitment for
experiment participants was about two and
one-half hours.
The treatment variable, risk of seller loss
or its absence, is operationalized via the tim-
ing of sales, i.e., sales take place either before
(forward market) or after (spot market) pro-
duction. Under treatment F, each trading pe-
riod consisted of a computerized double auc-
tion (DA). Under treatment S, each trading
period began with an explicit production
phase, during which each seller chose the
number of units he or she wished to produce
for that particular period, followed by trading
in a DA. Under both treatments, each DA in
each trading period had a time limit of three
minutes, while each session consisted of 15 to
16 trading periods. Sellers were allowed to
sell, at most, the number of units they had pro-
duced, and inventory carryover between pe-
riods was not allowed. Production costs of any
unsold units, having already been incurred,
represented a sunk cost to the seller. Upon
completion of trading, participants under both
treatments were presented with a summary
screen which detailed all transactions and up-
dated token and cash balances (discussed be-
low).
As noted above, the trading mechanism,
identical under both treatments, was a double
auction. DA markets have been used exten-
sively in laboratory research and are well doc-
umented elsewhere (e.g., Davis and Holt). It
is conceded that the DA provides a means of
price discovery which is informationally
richer than the various means generally en-
countered in real-world agricultural markets.
In the present study, however, the use of a DA
serves two purposes. First, the DA is an effi-
cient and thoroughly documented trading in-
stitution, thus providing a baseline for future
work exploring other trading institutions; and
second, the DA provides a basis for compar-
ison with past research, especially that of Mes-
telman and Welland, and also Smith (1962).
Redemption values (production costs) as-
signed to buyers (sellers) were held constant
across both treatments and within each session
(a stationary repetitive design). These values
and costs were denoted in “tokens,” an arti-













Note: Redemption values and production costs were the
same for each buyer or seller in the experiment.
ficial currency converted into cash at the rate
of one token equals one cent. The values and
costs assigned for each of the eight units (the
maximum allowed to trade per individual per
period) are listed in table 1.
For a buyer, earnings on each unit pur-
chased equaled the redemption value of the
particular unit less the price paid to the seller.
For a seller, earnings on each unit sold equaled
the price received by the seller less the pro-
duction cost of the particular unit. At the con-
clusion of each session, subjects were paid
their accumulated cash earnings.
Following Mestelman and Welland, four
buyers and four sellers participated in each
market session. While this competitive struc-
ture, in terms of numbers, may not be ob-
served in natural markets, it serves as a useful
first approximation for the conditions found in
the real world and as a benchmark for the
study of other structures (e.g., oligopsony).
Moreover, a large number of market partici-
pants is not necessary to generate competitive
outcomes in the double auction. “Competitive
predictions are somewhat weakened when the
market is reduced to only two sellers, but com-
petitive price, quantity, and efficiency levels
are often observed, even in monopolies” (Da-
vis and Holt, p. 155).
Results and Discussion
The mean, across three sessions under each
treatment, of average trade prices observed330 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, December 1997
during a given period, along with mean quan-
tities traded, are reported in table 2 and illus-
trated in figures 1 and 2. The competitive price
equilibrium for the laboratory market is 80.
From table 2, there is an apparent tendency
for mean price under the spot treatment to be
biased above the competitive equilibrium, and
for mean price under the forward treatment to
be below 80. We also observed that the vari-
ances of prices under both treatments gener-
ally decline over time. 1The competitive quan-
tity equilibrium for the laboratory market is
between 20 and 24 units per period, The av-
erage total quantities traded over all 15 periods
for the forward market and spot market ses-
sions were 20.89 and 18.78 units, respectively.
The null hypothesis of equal quantities traded
in the forward and spot treatments was reject-
ed in favor of the alternative hypothesis (quan-
tity traded in the forward market not equal to
quantity traded in the spot market) in only two
of the 15 periods (table 2). The quantities trad-
ed in the forward market are only slightly
higher than those in the spot markets using the
1Due to the small sample size, we are unable to
plausibly test for heterogeneity across the two treat-
ments. We are conceptualizing an observation as being
the average of prices within a given period in a given
session, Hence, for each period, we have three obser-
vations drawn from the forward market population and
three observations drawn from the spot market popu-
lation. Due to a learning effect, it is plausible to argue
that the two populations evolve over trading periods;
hence, testing period-by-period is a defensible strategy.
The sample variance about the grand mean is calcu-
lated as
“=KX-2112
and the standard deviations are reported in table 2. We
conducted a standard F-test of the hypothesis,
HO:cr] = u: versus H,: u} = cr~.
Using this test, we reject the null in periods 5, 9, and
12. It should be noted, however, that this test outcome
is merely suggestive. In particular, the assumption of
normality underlying the F-test is dubious given this
data. In testing for a difference in means, we avoid any
reliance on distributional assumptions by utilizing the
nonpararnetric permutation test.
nonparametric permutation test (Siegel and
Castellan).
The two-tailed probability for the nonpara-
metric permutation test is also displayed in ta-
ble 2.2 Clearly there is a tendency for prices
under treatment S to converge to higher levels
than under treatment F. The null hypothesis of
equal mean price (Ho: Wf = ~,) is rejected in
favor of the alternative hypothesis of unequal
mean price in spot and forward markets (H,:
p, # I.@ in the final nine trading periods.
The tendency for prices under treatment S
to converge to significantly higher behavioral
equilibria than those under treatment F is a
result consistent with findings of the recently
released Grain Inspection, Packers, and Stock-
yards Administration (GIPSA) report (U.S.
Department of Agriculture). This is not a com-
pletely valid comparison, of course, since the
two markets were studied in isolation in the
experiment and occur as alternatives in real-
world markets. Our laboratory results are,
however, at odds with results found previously
by both Smith (1962) and Mestelman and
Welland. In order to understand the economic
significance of our results, we must pursue the
question of why our results differ from those
of past related laboratory studies. We imme-
diately note that the experiments reported
herein used a computerized double auction,
whereas Smith (1962) and Mestelman and
Welland investigated similar treatments using
an oral double auction, It is possible that the
speed with which a computerized auction op-
erates relative to an oral auction could have
imparted more urgency on the part of buyers
(discussed further below).
We believe a more important difference is
that buyers and sellers in the present experi-
ments were allowed (and given incentive) to
purchase and sell a greater number of units
than subjects in either Smith’s or Mestelman
2The permutation test allows for the calculation of
the exact probability associated with any possible set
of observations under the assumption that the null hy-
pothesis is true. It does not require any distributional
assumptions to be made regarding the underlying pop-
ulations under study, and is an especially powerful and
useful test for small samples. In particular, it does not
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Period
Mean of quantities traded in forward and spot markets
and Welland’s experiments. In Smith’s exper- two units, In the Mestelman and Welland
iment, one portion of the participants could study, a buyer (seller) could purchase (sell) up
purchase (sell) only one unit, while the re- to six units, but the equilibrium level for either
maining portion could purchase (sell) up to buyer or seller was only two. In the presentKrogmeier et al.: Price Discovery in Forward and Spot Markets 333
experiment, the maximum number of units al-
lowed per individual per period was eight,
while the competitive equilibrium level was
between five and six units. The incentive to
purchase more than one or two units would
contribute substantially to the urgency attrib-
uted to buyers in our spot markets.
In explaining the reason for lower prices in
advance production (spot) markets relative to
production-to-demand (forward) markets,
Smith (1962) views the problem from the sell-
er’s perspective. Discussing the convergence
to competitive equilibrium observed in his
preliminary advance production market, Smith
states:
The approachis from below as might be ex-
pected by the ‘distress sale’ characteristics
of the market.The pressureon producers to
sell seems to have had its strongesteffect in
period 1, in which market prices tended to
decline from the opening. Prices moved er-
ratically in period 2, and in the remaining
periods climbed steadily in the direction of
equilibrium (p, 137).
In Smith’s “distress sale” argument, sellers do
not want to be left with excess stock that rep-
resents a sunk cost.
Since the results of our experiment contra-
dict those found by Smith, the “distress sale”
reasoning appears in doubt. To provide a plau-
sible explanation for the behavior observed in
the present experiment, we offer an alternative
information-based argument as follows. Con-
sider the perspective of a buyer. The infor-
mation sets of buyers during a given trading
period differed across treatments in the fol-
lowing sense. Under treatment F, the buyer
knew from the instructions there was no mean-
ingful limit to the number of units he or she
could purchase in the market. In other words,
it is almost certain that individual buyers could
purchase up to eight units (the maximum al-
lowable) if they were willing to bid a suffi-
ciently high price. Under treatment S, this is
not necessarily so. Here, the already produced
quantity had been set prior to trading, and total
production levels were unknown to buyers.
There existed, therefore, a very real possibility
of a limit to the number of units which could
be purchased. Regardless of how high a buyer
in a spot market was willing to bid, it was
possible he or she would not purchase a “sat-
isfactoryy“ number of units. An implication of
this subtle difference in information is that
buyers under treatment S are apt to bid up
prices since supply is inelastic at the quantity
produced. Inelastic supply could plausibly
lend a sense of urgency to a buyer’s bidding
strategy. This sense of urgency on a buyer’s
part would be compounded by the observed
tendency of the majority of trades to occur rel-
atively quickly within a trading period, An av-
erage of 61 ‘%oof the trades were made during
the first minute over the 15 periods in spot
market sessions two and three. On average,
46% of the trades occurred during the first
minute of trading in the first spot session. The
average number of trades during the first min-
ute over the 15 periods in the three forward
market sessions ranged from 52?Z0 to 55Y0.
Figure 3 illustrates that trading has a tendency
(although not strong) to be more active during
the first minute of trading in the spot market,
as compared to the forward market.
From the observation that trades were oc-
curring slightly more rapidly at the beginning
of trading periods, along with the impact of
inelastic supply on buyers’ information sets, it
is argued that buyers under treatment S were
more aggressive relative to their counterparts
under treatment F. It is noteworthy that this
“quick trading” behavior also has been ob-
served in actual livestock auctions (Buccola
1982; Turner, Dykes, and McKissick).
Our information-based argument, however,
is in the nature of an a posteriori explanation,
and should be viewed as speculative. Tying
the cause of the difference in mean price be-
tween the spot and forward markets to differ-
ences in supply elasticities was not specifically
addressed in the experiment, nor is it the result
of a direct statistical test. Moreover, there may
be alternative causes and explanations for the
results observed in the experiment. Among
these might be characteristics of traders, in-
cluding their risk preferences (Buccola 1983)
and costs of delay or waiting (McMillan).
Each of these causes, including our inelastic-
supply/information-based argument, would
need to be the focus of further experiments to








Figure 3. Number of periods in which 50% or more of the trades occurred in the first minute
for three sessions, forward and spot markets
Implications
In the present inquiry into forward contract
and spot market price discovery processes,
laboratory methods were particularly well
suited for two reasons. First, much of the data
needed for a traditional econometric analysis
are not readily available. Second, the task of
collecting the relevant data needed to ade-
quately specify an econometric model would
necessitate that such a study be relatively nar-
row in space and time. The drawback to the
method of inquiry used in this study is that
laboratory methods are limited in terms of the
treatments examined, and hence they lack di-
rect application to real-world markets. All rel-
evant features of a real-world market are dif-
ficult to duplicate in a laboratory setting, and,
in the interest of establishing baseline results,
were not duplicated in the present design.
Specific to this study, there are a number
of differences between the structure of our ex-
periment and existing agricultural markets.
For example, the use of the double auction
trading mechanism is both a strength and a
weakness. Given its well-documented efficien-
cy in generating competitive outcomes with
small numbers of participants, the double auc-
tion procedure can be viewed as a strength be-
cause it allowed us to effectively identify
whether economic agent behavior is different
in forward and spot markets. A weakness of
this trading mechanism is that it does not ad-
equately parallel the institutional characteris-
tics of the private treaty, English auction, or
formula pricing mechanisms which are the ba-
sis for transactions in many agricultural mar-
kets. The double auction mechanism provides
more information to buyers and sellers than is
the case in the more typical trading mecha-
nisms, Although the market prices generated
in our experiment may not reflect all features
of naturally occurring markets, they are
uniquely suited for examining the differences
in pricing behavior in double auction forward
and spot markets.
As a result of not strictly incorporating fea-
tures of the actual marketplace in the labora-
tory experiment, caution must be exercised in
drawing inferences from experiment results to
behavior in real-world markets. Nevertheless,
as previously argued, our design allows forKrogmeier et al.: Price Discovery in Forward and Spot Markets 335
comparison of results with those of other lab-
oratory studies. More importantly, the results
of our experiment provide a baseline with
which to compare future studies that explore
pricing behavior in forward and spot markets
using alternative trading mechanisms, as well
as different numbers of market participants.
For more in-depth understanding, we believe
this type of laboratory work will require that
the steps toward realism be small, but large in
number.
Despite these caveats, the tendency ob-
served in our experiment for prices to be rel-
atively higher in the spot market may still
have application to real-world markets. The
information-based argument explaining higher
relative spot prices is a working hypothesis
which could have implications for naturally
occurring markets. In a similar vein, Arrow
proposed a model of vertical integration in
which uncertainty on the part of downstream
firms exists regarding the supply of an inter-
mediate good by upstream firms. The need for
information regarding the available production
of this intermediate product motivates the
downstream firm to integrate backwards into
production of the intermediate good. The ad-
ditional information gained via the integration
improves the ability of the downstream firm
to forecast spot prices, and thus facilitates pro-
duction planning.3 Williamson has argued that
a prominent reason for vertical integration is
the uncertainty that exists between buyers and
sellers in the production chain. Contracts,
bounded in scope by our limited ability to
foresee all contingencies, cannot eliminate all
of these uncertainties, so an incentive to inte-
grate exists.
In an experimental market, we observed
the effect of less information on downstream
buyers. The effect was to increase competitive
bidding in the spot market, hence driving pric-
es up. This may indicate a further motive by
firms to vertically integrate andor promote
1Hennessy argues that the type of motivation for
vertical integration suggested by Arrow is of less rel-
evance to food industries due to both the typical ex-
istence of futures, markets and the extensive amount of
information regarding agricultural markets disseminat-
ed by government agencies and universities.
forward contracting. Vertical integration and/
or forward contracting partially solves an in-
formation problem faced by buyers and, no
doubt, facilitates efficient operation of produc-
tion facilities. It is tentatively posited that ver-
tical integration and/or forward contracting
may further enable the firm to avoid a con-
sequence of this information problem which,
given a competitive market, could force the
buyer to bid prices higher.
Finally, the results of this study provide the
basis for exploring in more detail the inelastic-
supply/information-based hypothesis predict-
ing higher prices in spot markets as compared
to forward markets. The impacts of other po-
tentially important factors such as risk pref-
erence and cost of delay, along with allowing
for a choice among spot, forward, or both
markets and alternative trading mechanisms,
warrant examination.
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